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VOLUME 2011 NUMBER 2
Are We "Paper Tigers"?
The Limited Procedural Power of
Arbitrators Under Chinese Law
Chi Manjiao *
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the contractual nature of arbitration and the principle of party auton-
omy, parties' agreement on arbitral procedures should be respected unless it vio-
lates any applicable mandatory rules.' In cases where parties have not agreed on
arbitral procedures, arbitrators (or arbitral tribunals) are required to conduct arbi-
tration in accordance with applicable arbitration rules and the lex loci arbitri.2
Under many arbitration instruments and leading institutional arbitration rules,3
*. BA, LL.M & Ph.D of Law, Associate Professor of International Law, Law School, Xiamen
University, China. The author is solely responsible for the ideas, errors or mistakes contained in this
paper. The author can be contacted at chimanjiao@xmu.edu.cn.
1. George A. Bermann, Introduction: Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 18 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 1, 5 (2007) ("There is widespread agreement that, irrespective of what the generally appli-
cable law might be, an international arbitral tribunal is bound to apply or otherwise respect the manda-
tory rules of arbitral procedure of the place of arbitration.").
2. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 282, 294 (KLUWER LAW AND TAXATION, 1981);
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 54
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2d ed. 2001).
3. In this paper, leading institutional arbitration rules refer to: the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), G.A. Res 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976)
[hereinafter 1976 UNCITRAL Rules], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf; the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Rules], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/courtlarbitration/id4093/index.html (fol-
low links for preferred language translation); the London Court of International Arbitration Rules
(1998) [hereinafter LCIA Rules], available at http://www.Icia.orgfDisputeResolutionServices/
LCIAArbitration Rules.aspx; the World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration Rules (2002)
[hereinafter WIPO Rules], available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules; the China Inter-
national Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Rules (2005) [hereinafter CIETAC Rules],
available at http://www.cietac.org/index/rules/47607adcbb68427f001.cms (English translation); the
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Rules (2008) [hereinafter HKIAC Rules], available at
http://www.hkiac.org/show-content.phparticle id=375 (follow link and choose the English transla-
tion); the American Arbitration Association Rules (2009) [hereinafter AAA Rules], available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (follow links for specific rules); the United Nations Commission
1
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arbitrators are granted broad procedural power in conducting arbitration. Arbitra-
tors can not only "shape" arbitration by exercising broad procedural power, but
they can also make arbitration a more flexible dispute settlement mechanism vis-
A-vis litigation. Typical forms of such procedural power include, inter alia: (1) the
power of making jurisdictional decisions (jurisdictional power); (2) the power of
making applicable law decisions (choice-of-law power); and (3) the power of
issuing interim measures. Even though these forms are not exhaustive, they are
indicative during key stages of arbitration. The extent to which arbitrators may
exercise their procedural power, though, often varies at the international level due
to the diversity of rules and laws regarding arbitration. The variance of this power
could be quite distinct between "arbitration-friendly countries" and "arbitration-
unfriendly countries."
China is trying to build itself into an "arbitration-friendly" country in an ef-
fort to become a more attractive destination for international trade and invest-
ment.4 Leading Chinese arbitration institutions witnessed an expanding caseload
in recent years as China experienced rapid economic development.5 Because
China has a long-term interest in continually attracting international trade and
investment, China must evaluate arbitrators' procedural power under Chinese law
to determine whether China is becoming an "arbitration-friendly country."
The purpose of this paper is to study how and to what extent arbitrators exer-
cise procedural power under Chinese law. Throughout this paper, arbitrators' pro-
cedural power under Chinese law is compared to their international counterparts
to understand the extent of their procedural power. The result of the study will
help the legal and business communities to better understand whether China has
grown into an "arbitration-friendly country," and if not, where further improve-
ments should be made.
This article explores the extent arbitrators exercise procedural power under
Chinese law in six parts. Part II briefly provides background information for the
legal framework of Chinese arbitration law and the "dual-track system" in the
Chinese arbitration regime. The ensuing parts deal with the three major aspects of
arbitrators' procedural power respectively: Part III discusses the power of making
jurisdictional decisions, Part IV analyzes the power of making applicable law
decisions, and Part V explores the power of issuing interim measures. Part VI
concludes that in all three aspects, the procedural power of arbitrators under Chi-
nese law is heavily restricted or denied when compared to their international coun-
terparts. Chinese law is restrictive because arbitrators' procedural power is allo-
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), G.A. Res 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter 2010 UNCITRAL Rules], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf; the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Rules (2010) [hereinafter SCC Rules], available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/
skiljedomsregler-4.aspx (follow links for English translation); the Singapore International Arbitration
Center Rules (2010) [hereinafter SIAC Rules], available at http://www.siac.org.sg/cms/
index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=210&Itemid=130.
4. For the purpose of the current study, the term "arbitration" refers only to "foreign-related com-
mercial arbitration," while state-investor arbitration and purely domestic arbitration are excluded.
5. For instance, according to the statistics provided by the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council
of China, the combined caseload of the 202 arbitration institutions in Mainland China is 74,811 in
2009, a 15% increase over that of 2008. LEGAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/fzjd/zcgz/201009/20100900263261.shtml
(last visited August 29, 2011).
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cated to the state, represented mainly by courts. Even though the centralization of
procedural power is expected in China, restricting or denying arbitrators' proce-
dural power under Chinese law is harmful to Chinese arbitration and turning them
into "paper tigers." Moreover, the centralization of procedural power could poten-
tially harm China's long-term goal of becoming an international trade and invest-
ment destination. China can remedy its harm to Chinese arbitration, however,
through a full-range judicial reform.
H. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHINESE ARBITRATION LAW AND THE
"DUAL-TRACK SYSTEM"
To understand the procedural power of arbitrators under Chinese law, it is
necessary to understand the two basic aspects of Chinese arbitration law: the legal
framework for Chinese arbitration law and the special "dual-track system" codi-
fied in Chinese arbitration law.
A. The Legal Framework for Chinese Arbitration Law
In short, the legal framework for Chinese arbitration law is composed of per-
suasive and mandatory authority.6 Persuasive authority in Chinese arbitration law
refers to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (1985 Model Law). The 1984 Model Law laid a substantial foundation for the
1994 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (CAL), China's only
comprehensive arbitration code.7 Mandatory authority is mainly composed of
three branches: international treaties,8 domestic laws, and the Supreme People's
Court (SPC) judicial interpretations.
The first branch of mandatory authority is the 1958 United Nations Conven-
tion on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention) which China joined with two reservations.9 The New York Conven-
6. See Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in
the Global Economy, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 428-435 (2006); Jian Zhou, Judicial Intervention in
International Arbitration: A Comparative Study of the Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and
Chinese Courts, 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 403, 409-414 (2006).
7. See John Mo, Probing the Uniformity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, 17 J. INT'L ARB. t,
12 (2000); Zhang Yulin, Towards the UNCITRAL Model Law - A Chinese Perspective, II J. INT'L
ARB. 87, 124 (1994).
8. As this paper focuses on commercial arbitration, such international treaties do not include the
1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States ("ICSID Convention") and many Sino-Foreign bilateral investment treaties (BITs), most of
which contain arbitration clauses directing contracting states and their nationals to international arbitra-
tion. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
http://icsid.worldbank.orgfICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Aug. 31, 2011) (follow link to see China's
signatory status of the ICSID Convention); MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA DEPARTMENT OF TREATY AND LAW, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/h/b.htm (last visited Aug. 31,
2011) (for general statistics on Sino-Foreign BITs); see also JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE IN CHINA 12-15 (The Hague: Kluwer Law Int'l 2005).
9. The New York Convention came into force in China as of 1987 subject to two reservations
relating respectively to the application scope and the commercial nature of the awards. See Status,
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tion takes prevalence over domestic laws when the two bodies of law are in con-
flict.10
The second branch, domestic laws, mainly consist of the CAL and the 1991
Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China as amended in 2007
(CPL), both of which dedicate a chapter exclusively to foreign-related arbitra-
tion.''
SPC judicial interpretations make up the third branch and are supposed to
guide all Chinese courts in handling cases.' 2 The SPC judicial interpretations con-
stitute a de facto "source" of Chinese arbitration law given their practical influ-
ence.
B. The "Dual-Track System"
In addition to mandatory and persuasive authorities of law, Chinese arbitra-
tion law also adopts the "dual-track system." Essentially, this system divides arbi-
tration into "foreign-related arbitration" and "domestic arbitration." The "dual-
track system" determines whether any foreign element is involved in the dispute,
and treats them accordingly.14 Although the term "dual-track system" per se never
10. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l People's
Cong. Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 236, translated at www.lawinfochina.com (search for
the English title of the document using the English translation search) [herinafter LAWINFOCHINA]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter CPL].
11. Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, Ch. 7 (promulgated by the Nat'l People's
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter CAL], translated in LAWINFOCHINA; CPL,
supra note 10, Ch. 28.
12. See Mark Lin, Supreme People's Court Rules on PRC Arbitration Issues, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 597,
597 (2007) (holding that SPC interpretations are gaining importance in judicial practice and suggests
that they constitute laws).
13. In practice, SPC judicial interpretations can be generally divided into four types: (1) those that
require local courts to abide by the New York Convention provisions, such as The SPC Notice on the
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to
which China Has Acceded (SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 1987-5, adopted on Apr. 10, 1987); (2)
those to guide local courts to deal with foreign-related arbitration, such as The SPC Notice on Issues
Related to the Handling of Foreign-related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration (SPC Judicial Inter-
pretation No. 1996-18, adopted on Aug. 28, 1995); (3) those to provide interpretation of CAL or CPL
to guide the local courts to correctly apply these laws, such as The SPC Interpretation on Certain
Issues Relating to the Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (SPC
Judicial Interpretation No. 2006-7, adopted on Aug. 23, 2006); The SPC Notice on Certain Issues
Relating to the Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (SPC Judicial
Interpretation No. 1997-4, adopted on Mar. 26, 1997); and The SPC Opinions Regarding Various
Issues Arising from the Application of the Civil Procedural Law of 1991 (SPC Judicial Interpretation
No.1992-22, adopted on July 14, 1992); (4) those to make special arrangements between Mainland
China and Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions, such as The SPC Arrangement on
Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Mainland and Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 2000-3, adopted on Jan. 24, 2000); The SPC
Arrangement on Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Mainland and
Macao Special Administrative Region (SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 2007-17, adopted on Dec. 12,
2007). For more such SPC judicial interpretations, refer to Jian Zhou, Judicial Intervention in Interna-
tional Arbitration: a Comparative Study of the Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese
Courts, I5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 403,421 (2006); Lin, supra note 12 at 587-99.
14. Chinese law does not contain a clear definition of the term "foreign-related arbitration," but
according to art. 304 of SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 1992-22, a case is "foreign-related" if (1) one
of or both parties are foreign nationals, stateless persons or foreign companies or organizations; or (2)
the legal actions leading to the formation, amendment or termination of a legal relationship occurred in
262 [Vol. 2011
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formally appears in China's arbitration law, the definition can still be ascertained
from many aspects of Chinese law and practices. 5 For the purpose of this current
study, this paper only focuses on foreign-related arbitration.
m. POWER OF MAKING JURISDICTIONAL DECISIONS
When challenges to the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel arise in international
arbitration-on grounds ranging from the validity of an arbitration agreement to
the composition of an arbitral panel-the competence-competence doctrine vests
power in arbitrators to determine their jurisdiction. As explained below, in China,
however, the competence-competence doctrine does not necessarily give arbitra-
tors the power to determine their jurisdiction when compared to international
practice.
A. The International Practice
It can hardly be denied that the competence-competence doctrine has been
well established in international commercial arbitration over time. The compe-
tence-competence doctrine often goes hand in hand with the doctrine of the sepa-
rability of arbitration agreements, and leading arbitration rules usually recognize
both doctrines simultaneously. Further, many international instruments, domestic
laws, and leading arbitration rules have codified the competence-competence doc-
trine. For instance, Article 23(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010
UNCITRAL Rules) states:
The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause that forms
part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the
contract is null shall not entail automatically the invalidity of the arbitra-
tion clause.
a foreign country; or (3) the subject matter is located in a foreign country. Besides, Hong Kong and
Macau Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan are all deemed under Chinese law as "foreign."
15. In practice, there are various aspects of the "dual-track system" in Chinese arbitration. For in-
stance, in "foreign-related arbitration," only the intermediate courts can make decisions on jurisdic-
tional challenges and issue interim measures; but in domestic arbitration, such courts are basic-level
courts. Besides, the two types of arbitration are subject to different judicial review standards in the
enforcement stage: domestic arbitral awards may be rejected for enforcement on substantive grounds,
particularly the incorrect application of law by the arbitrators, but foreign-related arbitral awards may
only be rejected on procedural grounds as provided in the New York Convention. See Jian Zhou, supra
note 5, 445-450 (detailing the "dual track system"); see also An Chen, On the Supervision Mechanism
of Chinese Arbitration Involving Foreign Elements and Its Tallying of International Practice, 14 J.
INT'L ARB. 39, 41-75 (1997); Wang Wenying, Distinct Features of Arbitration in China: A Historical
Perspective, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 49, 60-71 (2006); Chi Manjiao, Drinking Poison to Quench Thirst: The
Discriminatory Arbitral Award Enforcement Regime under Chinese Arbitration Iaw, 39 HONG KONG
L. J. 541, 546-548 (2009).
16. The competence-competence doctrine essentially states that arbitrators shall have the power to
rule on their own jurisdiction. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 396 (KLUWER LAW INT'L, 1999).
No. 2] 263
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Similar provisions are incorporated in the 1985 Model Law," the 2006
Amendment to the 1985 Model Law (2006 Model Law),' 8 and many leading insti-
tutional arbitration rules. 19
B. The Chinese Practice
Chinese arbitration law only partly recognizes the competence-competence
doctrine, which deserves careful review.
1. CAL and the Competence-Competence Doctrine
Unlike Article 23(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, CAL does not clearly
provide that arbitrators have competence to decide their own jurisdiction regard-
less of the validity or existence of the underlying contract. In fact, the compe-
tence-competence doctrine as codified in CAL-if it does indeed exist-is quite
"unique." Article 19 of the CAL states:
An arbitration agreement stands on its own. Modification, rescission,
termination of the contract or its being declared invalid does not affect
the arbitration agreement's validity. The arbitration tribunal has the
power to confirm the validity of the contract.
Article 19 deserves a careful reading because the first two sentences recognize the
doctrine of the separability of the arbitration agreement by drawing a clear distinc-
tion between an arbitration agreement contained within the underlying contract-
which seems to conform to the international practice. 20 However, the last sentence
deviates from the international practice because arbitrators are only allowed to
confirm the validity of the contract but not the arbitration agreement. Because
Article 19 is silent on arbitrators' ability to determine their competence, a proce-
dural question naturally arises: who should make jurisdictional decisions under
Chinese law?
The above question is partly answered by Article 20 of the CAL, which deals
exclusively with the situation where the parties challenge the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement. The relevant part of Article 20 reads:
17. Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), G.A. Res 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72, art.16 (1) (Dec. I1,
1985) [hereinafter 1985 Model Law], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf.
18. Revised Articles of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), G.A. Res 61/33, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/33, art.16 (1) (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/A2E.pdf.
19. ICC Rules, supra note 3, art. 6.2; LCIA Rules, supra note 3, art. 23.1; WIPO Rules, supra note
3, art. 36(a); HKIAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 20.1; AAA Rules, supra note 3, art. 15.1; SIAC Rules,
supra note 3, art. 25.2.
20. See Gu Weixia, China's Search for Complete Separability of the Arbitral Agreement, 3 ASIAN J.
INT'L ARB. 163, 173 (2007).
264 [Vol. 2011
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Where a party raises the challenge to the validity of the arbitration
agreement, he may request the arbitration commission to make a decision
or the people's court to make a judgment. Where one party requests the
arbitration commission to make a decision while the other party requests
the people's court to make a judgment, the people's court shall make a
judgment.
Article 20 permits the challenging party to allocate jurisdictional power to either
the arbitration institutions or the court to determine the validity of the arbitration
agreement. The court, however, automatically has jurisdictional power to deter-
mine the validity of the arbitration agreement under Article 20 if the parties can-
not agree upon whether the arbitration institutions or the court has jurisdictional
power.
2. SPC and the Competence-Competence Doctrine
Due to the "dual-track system" in Chinese arbitration law, Articles 19 and 20
of the CAL are further clarified and supplemented by the SPC judicial interpreta-
tions that deal exclusively with foreign-related arbitration. First, SPC Judicial
Interpretation No. 2006-7 addresses the question of the court's competence to
determine a jurisdictional challenge by stating that only intermediate courts have
the power to make jurisdictional decisions.21 Second, SPC Judicial Interpretation
No. 1995-18 addresses the question of procedures in such challenges by establish-
,,22ing the "pre-reporting scheme. Under this scheme, if an intermediate court
negatively rules on a jurisdictional challenge for lack of a valid or executable
arbitration agreement, it must automatically report to the competent high court. If
the high court upholds the intermediate court's decision, the higher court must
report to the SPC for a final decision. 23 This scheme substantially marginalizes the
jurisdictional power of the lower courts because it subjects the intermediate
21. Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong (zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongcai fa) rudgan wenti
de jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of the
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26,
2005, effective Aug. 23, 2006), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sep. 29, 2011) [hereinafter
SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 2006-7], art. 12, 2. According to this SPC Judicial Interpretation, the
intermediate court could be that of the place I) where the arbitration institution is located; or 2) where
the arbitration agreement is concluded; or 3) where the domicile of the applicant is located; or 4) where
the domicile of the respondent is located.
22. See Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong "zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhotgcai fa" ruogan
wenti de jieshi [Sup. People's Ct. Notice on Issues Related to the Handling of Foreign-related Arbitra-
tion and Foreign Arbitration] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 28, 1995, effective Aug. 28,
1995), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sep. 29, 2011) [hereinafter SPC Judicial Interpreta-
tion No. 1995-18], art. 1, 2 (this SPC Judicial Interpretation contains two provisions dealing with
jurisdictional challenge (art. 1) and rejection of the enforcement of awards (art. 2) respectively); see
also Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu tiaozheng zhongguo renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa "de
shunxu bianhao fayuan de jueding, yin sifa jieshi ji qfta wenjian [Decision of the Supreme People's
Court on Adjusting the Sequential Number of the Articles of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's
Republic of China Cited in Judicial Interpretations and Other Documents] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Dec. 16, 2008), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sep. 29, 2011) [hereinafter
SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 2008-18] (Article 2 of the SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 1995-18 has
been amended, but art. I remains effective.).
23. SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 1995-18, supra note 22, art. 1.
No. 2]1 265
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courts' decisions to review if the immediate courts' negatively rule on the jurisdic-
tional challenge concerning the arbitration agreement. Consequently, intermediate
courts must issue an affirmative ruling on jurisdictional challenges to prevent their
decisions from automatically being reviewed by the higher court and possibly the
SPC.
a. Comments on the CAL, SPC, and the Competence-Competence
Doctrine
Several observations can be drawn from the analysis of the above provisions.
First, they deprive arbitrators of their power of making jurisdictional decisions,
but grant such power to arbitration institutions and intermediate courts, with the
SPC retaining the final say. 24 Such provisions constitute a de facto exclusion of
the competence-competence doctrine. Second, they restrict the legal grounds for
raising jurisdictional challenges to non-existent, invalid and non-executable chal-
lenges against the arbitration agreement while excluding other grounds such as
improper composition of the arbitral tribunal. While such procedural defects may,
in theory, be "cured" in the award enforcement stage should the injured party
apply for rejection or to set-aside the award, such judicial remedy would often be
too late and costly to the injured party. Third, the provisions contain a hidden
defect because the provisions allow parties to freely choose the decision-maker of
the jurisdictional challenge. This is problematic because the process allows the
parties to choose whether they would like to submit their challenge to the arbitra-
tion institutions or to the court. As a consequence, a challenging party can exclude
the arbitration institution if they choose to raise their challenge to the court. Given
that court proceedings are generally more rigid and time-consuming than arbitral
proceedings and that the "pre-reporting scheme" is particularly lengthy, there is a
risk that parties will abuse Articles 19 and 20 of the CAL by intentionally delay-
ing or frustrating the arbitration process.25
Additionally, these provisions also put Chinese arbitration institutions in an
awkward situation. On the one hand, arbitration institutions need to recognize the
competence-competence doctrine to keep their rules and practice abreast with
international practice and enhance their global competitiveness. On the other the
hand, they must make sure that their rules conform to the mandatory CAL provi-
sions, which essentially go against the competence-competence doctrine. To cope
with this tension, many Chinese arbitration institutions make "special arrange-
ments"26 which is evident in CIETAC.
24. Andrew Shields, China's Two-Pronged Approach to International Arbitration: New Rules and
New Law, 15 J. INT'L ARB. 67, 69 (1998).
25. See Chi Manjiao, Is Chinese Arbitration Law Arbitration-Friendly? - Determining the Validity
ofArbitration Agreement under Chinese Law, 4 ASIAN J. INT'L ARB. 104, 118-19 (2008).
26. See CIETAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 6 (1); Beijing Arbitration Commission Rules, art. 6 (3)-(4)
(2008) [hereinafter BAC Rules], available at http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/arbitration/index.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2011); Shenzhen Arbitration Commission Rules art. 12 (2008) [hereinafter SZAC
Rules], available at http://www.szac.org/en/service/rule.aspx?MenulD-02030305 (last visited Oct. 9,
2011); Shanghai Arbitration Commission Rules, art. 12 (2005) [hereinafter SHAC Rules], available at
http://www.accsh.org.cn/accsh/english/node67/node68/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (The
SHAC Rules only recognize that the SHAC can make jurisdictional decisions but are silent as to
whether such power can be delegated to the arbitrators).
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3. CIETAC and the Competence-Competence Doctrine
CIETAC is the leading arbitration institution in China and it handles a large
sum of cases each year.27 The jurisdictional provision of the CLETAC Rules reads,
"CIETAC shall have the power to determine the existence and validity of an arbi-
tration agreement and its jurisdiction over an arbitration case. CIETAC may, if
necessary, delegate such power to the arbitral tribunal."28 The first sentence of this
provision confirms the position of CAL, but the second sentence partly adopts the
competence-competence doctrine by allowing CIETAC arbitrators to make juris-
dictional decisions with its authorization. By doing so, CIETAC plays "edge
ball."29
There are several hidden defects in this construction. First, the authorization
is neither general nor automatic but is granted on a case-by-case basis, which
lacks predictability and reliability in practice. Second, and perhaps more funda-
mental when considering that arbitration rules must conform to the mandatory
rules of the lex loci arbitri, it remains unclear whether CIETAC can legally dele-
gate its jurisdictional power to arbitrators. CAL is silent as to if and to what extent
the arbitration institutions can delegate its jurisdictional power to arbitrators.
However, one may sense that the CIETAC Rules in various provisions is quite
cautious and generally retains procedural power for itself. For instance, arbitrators
do not have power to grant interim measures and arbitration institutions must
submit such a request to the court. A reason for this process is to prevent a multi-
member tribunal from determining whether arbitration should continue when an
arbitrator withdraws from the tribunal. In this case, the CIETAC's director will
rule whether the arbitration proceedings should continue instead of the remaining
tribunal members. 30
Interestingly, such arrangements have not been challenged in the award en-
forcement stage for practical considerations because parties could have raised the
challenge to the court if they had ever wanted to avoid the delegation of power.
This arrangement may still be criticized on the ground that arbitrators but not
arbitration institutions are in a better position to make jurisdictional decisions
because they are the persons who really know about and deal with the dispute. It is
this reason that some commentators have suggested that "Kompetenz-Kompetenz
is painted with Chinese characteristics in CIETAC arbitration," and that China is
"the only country" that adopted legislation "in open contradiction to the compe-
tence-competence principle."32 Despite the legality of CIETAC delegating juris-
27. See Introduction, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Sep. 4, 2011).
28. CIETAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 6 (1).
29. "Edge ball" is a phrase often used in Chinese games to describe a situation where a ball lands on
the out-of-bounds marker of a court. Such a scenario creates a gray area in the game's rules regarding
whether the ball is legally playable. Similar to the gray area that "edge ball" creates in a game's rules,
CIETAC's act of delegating power to arbitrators is "edge ball" in Chinese law because the law is not
clear whether CIETAC can legally do so.
30. CIETAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 28.
31. Yulin, supra note 7, at 108.
32. Antonias Dimolitsa, Separability and Kompetenz-Konpetenz in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION 231 (Albert J. Van Den Berg, Kluwer Law Int'l, 1998).
No. 2] 267
9
Manjiao: Manjiao: Are We Paper Tigers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
dictional power to arbitrators, it is still questionable whether arbitrators can truly
exercise such power independently. Although CAL provides that arbitration shall
be conducted independently 33 and that arbitration institutions are independent
organs;34 the independence of these institutions is doubtful35 because CIETAC
maintains close relations with government agencies.36
C. Comparing International Arbitration to Arbitration Under Chinese Law
In modern international arbitration, the competence-competence doctrine has
been well established. This doctrine is fundamental because it not only respects
the autonomy of arbitrators and the private nature of arbitration; it also helps
avoid pre-enforcement judicial interference into arbitration, which is essential for
the maintenance of the efficiency, flexibility and autonomy of arbitration. CAL,
on the other hand, does not fully and truly recognize the competence-competence
doctrine. Instead, CAL allocates the jurisdictional power to arbitration institutions
and courts, improperly grants courts too much power which could invite prema-
ture judicial interference into arbitration, and creates a legal framework that poten-
tially permits parties to abuse jurisdictional power. Although some arbitration
institutions may delegate their statutory jurisdictional power to their arbitrators,
this delegation of power is questionable concerning its lack of predictability, le-
gality, and real efficacy.
IV. POWER OF MAKING APPLICABLE LAW DECISIONS
Applicable law plays a fundamental role in deciding the result of arbitration.
Almost all leading arbitration instruments contain certain forms of applicable law
provisions, which essentially deal with two major aspects: what law should be
applied to solve the dispute and how such law should be identified. The first as-
pect explores the sources of applicable law, which could be roughly categorized as
three types: international law rules, domestic law rules, and supranational or a-
national rules which belong to no state such as trade usages or lex mercatoria.
33. CAL, supra note 11, art. 8.; CPL, supra note 10, art. 8.
34. CAL, supra note 11, art. 14.; CPL, supra note 10, art. 14.
35. The level of independence of the arbitration institutions in China is quite low for various rea-
sons: they used to be affiliated organs of state administrative organs, they are financially dependent on
government budgets, and their high-ranking leadership positions are often held by public officers.
However, it is suggested that Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC), a prominent local arbitration
institution in China, has largely achieved independence particularly because of its wise and strong
leadership. See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence and Fairness: A Case Study of
the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 313, 351 (2007).
36. Although there are no legislative documents that expressly establish formal relations between
CIETAC and government organs, such relations can be shown by many other aspects. For instance,
CIETAC is under the leadership of the Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade (CPPIT),
a state administrative organ, while the President of CCPIT is also the Director of CIETAC; the leader-
ship of CIETAC is also largely composed of high-ranking civil servants of China. See Russell Thir-
good, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 89, 97-98 (2000).
37. For a general discussion on the topic of lex mercatiria, see generally KLAUS PETER BERGER,
THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA (The Hauge: Kluwer 1999); Ralf Michaels,
The True Lex Mercatoria: The Law beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447
(2007); Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2
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The second aspect explores whether arbitrators can freely make applicable law
decisions (choice-of-law power). If arbitrators freely have a choice-of-law power,
to what extent can they exercise such power. This Part will focus on the choice-of-
law power of arbitrators under Chinese law.
A. The International Practice
The extent to which arbitrators may exercise their choice-of-law power varies
depending on the applicable arbitration laws and rules. At the international level,
there are three major patterns, which are briefly summarized below.
I. Unlimited Choice-of-Law
The first pattern grants the arbitrators "unlimited choice-of-law power,"
which is adopted exclusively in arbitration ex aequo et bono or amiables compo-
siteurs.38 Under this pattern, the arbitrators do not necessarily need to base their
awards on any specific rule(s) or law(s) of any state. Rather, they are allowed to
decide the dispute according to the legal principles they believe are just such as
the principles of equity or good faith. At the global level, many leading arbitration
rules and laws allow such arbitration as long as the parties expressly consent to
arbitrators' "unlimited choice-of-law power." 39 It is fair to say that this pattern
represents the highest level of choice-of-law power available in practice.
2. Substantive Choice-of-Law
The second pattern grants the arbitrators "substantive choice-of-law power,"
which allows them to directly decide the substantive law without necessarily re-
sorting to any conflict-of-laws rule(s). A typical example of this pattern employs
such terms as "the arbitrators may apply the law or rules of law they deem appro-
priate." Similar terms are found in the newly adopted 2011 French Arbitration
Law and the newly revised 2010 UNICITRAL Rules, both of which provide that
arbitrators shall decide the disputes according to "the rules of law they deem ap-
propriate" absent parties' choice.40
EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 235, 235 (1987); Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New
Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B. U.
INT'L L. J. 317, 317 (1984); Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration,
34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747 (1985); Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-
Five Years, 4 ARB. INT'L 86, 86 (1988).
38. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Amiable Compositeur (Joint Mandate to Settle) and Ex Bono et
Aequo (Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Low): Apparent Synonyms Revisited, 9 J. INT'L ARB.
5, 14 (1992) ("Amiable compositeur and ex bono et aequo are frequently held to be synonyms. This
basically derives from French law, which construes the role of amiable compositeur as that of deciding
en dquitd (in equity)").
39. ICC Rules, supra note 3, art. 17(3); LCIA Rules, supra note 3, art. 22(4); WIPO Rules, supra
note 3, art. 59(a); HKIAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 31(2); AAA Rules, supra note 3, art. 28(3); 2010
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 3, art. 35(2); SCC Rules, supra note 3, art. 22(3); SIAC Rules, supra
note 3, art. 27(2).
40. The d6cret no 2011-48 portant riforme de I'arbitrage [Law 2011-48 of January 13, 2011 regard-
ing Reform of Arbitration], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [1.0.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETrE OF FRANCE], Jan. 14, 2011, p. 777; 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 3, art. 35(1).
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Similarly, before the adoption of the International Chamber of Commerce
Rules (ICC), eminent ICC arbitrators have been well aware that they "are not
bound to apply the rules of conflict of one country rather than another," and sug-
gested that they "are not subject to binding rules of conflict or substantive rules
requiring compulsory application" and that "there is no system regulating interna-
,,4 1tional private law relations that is specific to international arbitration. It is per-
haps for such reasons that the ICC Rules expressly provide that ". . . the Arbitral
Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate." 42
Similar provisions may also be found in other leading arbitration rules.
3. Procedural Choice-of-Law
The third pattern grants arbitrators "procedural choice-of-law power." This
means that arbitrators cannot directly decide the substantive law to settle a dispute
but can choose the conflict of laws rule(s) to settle the dispute. Compared to the
first and the second patterns this pattern grants less of a choice-of-law power to
arbitrators. Typical examples of this pattern might employ clauses like "the arbi-
trators may apply the law directed by the conflict-of-laws rules they deem appro-
priate." For example, the 1985 Model Law provides that ". . . the arbitral tribunal
shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers
applicable."" An identical provision also appears in the 2006 Amendments of the
Model Law (2006 Model Law).45 Similar provisions can also be found in the 1961
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,46 and the 1996
English Arbitration Act.47
A recent trend has emerged in international arbitration to broaden arbitrators'
choice-of-law power. In this regard, the "pattem-switch" of the applicable law
provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules is particularly noteworthy. Originally, the
applicable law provision of the 1976 UNICITRAL Rules merely granted the arbi-
trators "procedural choice-of-law power" (the second pattern), which in relevant
part reads that ". . . the arbitral tribunal shall appl the law determined by the con-
flict of laws rules which it considers applicable." However, as mentioned above,
this provision was recently revised and the 2010 UNICITRAL Rules clearly
switched to the third pattern to grant the arbitrators "substantive choice-of-law
power." The implication of such "pattern-switch" could be quite far-reaching if
41. Yves Derains, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Commercial Arbitration
(1): A European Perspective, ICC INT'LCOURTARB. BULL.9, 12 (Supp. 2002).
42. ICC Rules, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
43. LCIA Rules, supra note 3, art. 22(3); AAA Rules, supra note 3, art. 28(1); WIPO Rules, supra
note 3, art. 59(a); HKIAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 31(1); SCC Rules, supra note 3, art. 22(1); SIAC
Rules, supra note 3, art. 27(1).
44. UNICTRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 28(2) (1985).
45. UNICTRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 28(2) (2006).
46. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. VII(1), Apr. 21, 1961, 484
U.N.T.S. 349.
47. English Arbitration Act, 1996 c. 23, § 46 (Eng.).
48. 1976 UNICTRAL Rules, supra note 3, art. 33(1).
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one considers the profound and wide influence of the UNCITRAL Rules in inter-
national ad hoc arbitration and domestic law-making undertakings. 49
B. The Chinese Practice
The "Chinese pattern" is fundamentally different when compared to the
above three prevailing patterns. It is important to note at the outset that Chinese
law does not grant the arbitrators "unlimited choice-of-law power" because arbi-
tration ex aequo et bono or amiables compositeurs is prohibited in China.o Thus
this paper will only compare the "Chinese pattern" with the second and the third
patterns.
An example of the "Chinese pattern" is in the CAL. Article 7 of the CAL
states, "The dispute shall be settled on the basis of the facts, in accordance with
the law and in a fair and reasonable manner." The position of CAL is followed by
arbitration rules in China.5' For example, the CIETAC Rules do not contain a
clearly-defined applicable law provision. However, they do contain characteristics
of an applicable law provision in Article 43 which is titled "The Making of the
Arbitral Award." Article 43(1) states:
The arbitral tribunal shall independently and impartially make its arbitral
award on the basis of the facts, in accordance with the law and the terms
of the contracts, with reference to international practices and in compli-
ance with the principle of fairness and reasonableness.
It is important to point out that the CIETAC Rules require arbitrators to consider
several different types of grounds when making awards, namely: (1) the facts, (2)
the law and the terms of contract, (3) international practices, and (4) the principle
of fairness and reasonableness. Although it is clear that "law" is one of the
grounds for the awards, it is unclear as to how arbitrators can identify such law.
This provision neither grants the choice-of-law power to nor provides any oper-
able guidance for arbitrators to make applicable law decisions. Given the vague-
ness of this provision, it is imperative to explore the applicable law identification
process in CIETAC arbitration. This process could be quite complicated and in-
volve several steps depending on individual cases.
In general, after CIETAC arbitrators confirm their jurisdiction over a case,
they have a duty to settle the dispute in accordance with "the law" as required by
the CIETAC Rules and CAL. Here, two possibilities exist. The first is that the law
chosen by parties shall be applied if there is a choice-of-law agreement unless it
violates the mandatory rule of Chinese law. The second (and most usual) possibil-
49. Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL's Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present
Situation and Future, 21 ARB. INT'L 443, 443 (2005) ("...some 50 states from all parts of the world
have adopted the ML for their national arbitration legislation. The ML was conceived for international
commercial arbitration, but a large number of states adopted the ML also for domestic arbitration.").
50. Though no express prohibition of Arbitration ex aequo et bono or amiables compositeurs can be
found in Chinese law, according to art. 7 of CAL, it is a mandatory obligation for the arbitrators to
adjudicate the case "on the basis of facts, in conformity with law and in a just and reasonable manner."
Such a provision sets up a de facto ban on Arbitration ex aequo et bono or amiables compositeurs.
51. CIETAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 43(1); BAC Rules, supra note 26, art. 60(2); SHAC Rules,
supra note 26, art. 5; SZAC Rules, supra note 26, art. 5.
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ity is that, should there be no existing choice-of-law agreement, arbitrators must
identify the applicable law to settle the dispute. It is at this point that the Chinese
law system comes into play.
Because the CIETAC Rules grant neither "substantive choice-of-law power"
nor "procedural choice-of-law power" to arbitrators, the first step of the applicable
law identification process would be to identify the applicable conflict-of-laws
rule(s). Yet, as the CIETAC Rules provide no conflict-of-laws rule, arbitrators
must turn to the lex loci arbitri for guidance. Concerning conflict-of-laws rule(s),
although CAL and CPL are the most pertinent domestic laws in the field of for-
eign-related arbitration, neither of them provides operable conflict of laws rules.
Such a vacuum is filled by the 1999 Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China (CCL), the 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Re-
public of China as amended in 2009 (GPCL) and the newly adopted 2010 Law on
the Applicable Laws in Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People's Republic
of China (LAL).52 All of these laws provide that in the absence of parties' choice,
"the law that has the closest connection with the contract" shall be applied (closest
connection formula). As suggested by some Chinese scholars, this formula has
evolved into the most prominent conflict-of-laws rule in Chinese private interna-
tional law, particularly in the field of contract law.54
Under Chinese law, the "closest connection formula" is not a single rule to be
applied at the arbitrators' discretion; on the contrary, it stands for a cluster of con-
flict-of-laws rules according to the SPC Judicial Interpretation No. 2007-14.
This judicial interpretation divides foreign-related contracts into 17 general types,
and designs 19 conflict- of-laws rules to deal with each of these types respec-
tively. 56 Such a division is based on the "characteristic performance" test.57 For
instance, the state where the seller's domicile is located at the conclusion of the
contract is considered to have the closest connection with an international sales
contract, and thus such state's law will control. However, in a dispute involving
a foreign-related construction contract, the controlling law will be that of the state
52. The LAL was adopted by the 17' Session of the Standing Committee of the 11' National Peo-
ple's Congress on October 28, 2010 and will come into effect as from April 1, 2011.
53. Zhongguo renmin gongheguo hetong fa [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] [here-
inafter CCL], translated in LAwINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (will come into effect from
April 1, 2011); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minfa tongze [General Principles of Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Arb. Int'l Congr., Aug. 27, 2009), art. 145 [hereinaf-
ter GPCL], translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); Zhong hua ren min gong he guo
she wai min shi guan xi fa lu shi yong fa [Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil
Relations of the People] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nateign-Related Civil Relations of the
People in a fair and), art. 2 [hereinafter LAL], translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sep. 30,
2011).
54. See Yu Shuhong, Xiao Yongping & Wang Baoshi, The Closest Connection Doctrine in the
Conflict of Laws in China, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L LAW 423, 424-426 (2009).
55. See gao ren min fa yuan guan yu shen li she wai min shi huo shang shi ge tong jiu fen an jian fa
lu kuo yong re gan wen ti de gui ding [Rules of the Supreme People's Court on the Relevant Issues
Concerning Application of Law in Dealing with Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Disputes]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., effective Aug. 8, 2007), translated in LAWINFOCHINA [herein-
after 2007 SPC Interpretation].
56. Id.
57. Shuhong, Yongping, & Baoshi, supra note 54, at 428.
58. 2007 SPC Interpretation, supra note 55, art. 5(1).
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where the construction site is located.59 As an exception, only when a contract
falls beyond the prescribed types and is not covered by the prescribed conflict-of-
laws rules, can the arbitrators exercise their discretion to decide the applicable
law. 0
Normally, arbitrators will be directed to the applicable substantive law almost
"automatically" after the conflict-of-laws rule is decided. There are times when an
unusual situation occurs, however. In such situations, if arbitrators are directed to
the law of a state which has more than one legal system, the application of re-
gional conflict-of-law rule(s) may be needed, which could further complicate the
applicable law identification process. On this issue, LAL clearly provides that if
arbitrators are directed to the law of a country with more than one legal jurisdic-
tion, they must apply the law of the jurisdiction with which the dispute bears "the
closet connection." 61
1. Conflict in a Multi-Jurisdictional China
Interestingly, China itself became a multi-jurisdictional country after the
handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 according to the "one coun-
try, two systems" policy codified in international instruments and domestic laws.62
This invites potential difficulty to the applicable law determination. For example,
in the field of international sales contract, the 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for Sale of Goods (CISG) is probably the most important of any uni-
form law instruments.63 China ratified CISG in 1986 with two reservations and
CISG came into force in China since 19 88 .6 However, China did not file a suit-
able depositary notification pertaining to the status of the CISG in Hong Kong
with the United Nations Secretary General after the handover.65 China's failure to
properly file makes the application of the CISG in Hong Kong controversial66 and
possibly inapplicable on this ground.67
59. Id. at art. 5(10).
60. Id. at art. 5.
61. LAL, supra note 53, art. 6.
62. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, P.R.C.-
U.K., art. 3(3), Dec. 19, 1984, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ljzg/3566/t25956.htm;
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa
[Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
and the Government of the People's Republic of China, effective July 1, 1997), pmbl., arts. 2 & 5
(China), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cnleng/wjb/zzjg/tyfl/2626/tl5466.htm.
63. By July 29, 2011, there were 77 state parties to CISG. The status of CISG is available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitraven/uncitral-texts/sale-goods/1980CISG-status.html (last visited Aug.
242011).
64. China's reservations on CISG concern respectively the application scope of CISG (art. l(l)(b))
and the formal requirement of contract (art. I1). See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISGI.
65. See Xiao Yongping & Long Weidi, Selected Topics on the Application of CISG in China, 20
PACE INT'L L. REv. 61, 62 & n. 2 (2008).
66. Id. at 61-84; see also Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Status of Hong Kong and Macao under the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 307, 312-
32 (2004).
67. For instance, in the Telecommunications Products Case, the dispute concerns an international
sales contract between a French party and a Hong Kong Party. The French Cour de Cassation held that
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2. Identification of the Rules
Finally, even if arbitrators successfully identify the suitable applicable sub-
stantive law, this is not the end of the process. As "applicable law" generally re-
fers to the state law system as a whole, 68 arbitrators may still need to identify the
exact rule(s) of that law to settle the dispute. At this point, arbitrators are allowed
to exercise their choice-of-law power. For instance, if Chinese contract law is to
be applied, arbitrators may exercise their discretion to pick up the suitable rule(s)
to settle the dispute. Yet, this could be a tough job in certain cases considering that
Chinese contract law has complicated sources which include, inter alia, CCL as
the core, relevant laws such as the GPCL, various SPC Judicial Interpretations and
numerous local legislations. 69 Also, the speed of China's legislative and regulatory
activities in recent years-fueled by its fast economic growth and imbalanced
regional development-may further complicate the process. Generally, upon com-
pleting the "four-step process," the dispute can be settled.
3. An Exceptional Situation of the Applicable Law Identification Process
But one should not oversee an exceptional situation where the applicable law
does not contain any rule or such a rule is insufficient or ineffective to settle the
dispute. Should this situation exist, according to both the CIETAC Rules 70 and
GPCL, 71 arbitrators may be free to apply "international practices" or "principle of
fairness and reasonableness" to settle the dispute, despite the fact that Chinese law
does not provide a clear definition of these terms. For example, in a CIETAC case
concerning an international sales contract between a Chinese party and a Korean
party, the parties made no choice of law and Korea was not a party to CISG by the
time of arbitration.72 The claimant requested the tribunal to apply the UNIDROIT
Principles on International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles), but
the tribunal rejected this application and decided to apply Chinese contract law
"According to art. 93 CISG, any Contracting State in which different systems of law are applicable in
relation to the matters dealt with in the Convention may declare that the Convention is to extend only
to one or more of its territorial units by way of notification to the Secretary General of the United
Nations stating expressly the territorial units to which the Convention extends... The People's Repub-
lic of China deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations a declaration announcing the
conventions to which China was a party at that date which should apply to Hong Kong. The CISG did
not figure on that list, nor had the CISG applied to Hong Kong before the retrocession of this territory
to the People's Republic of China by the United Kingdom. Thereby, the People's Republic of China
has effectuated with the depositary of the Convention a formality equivalent to what is provided for in
art. 93 CISG. Consequently, the CISG is not applicable to the special administrative region of Hong
Kong." See Cour de cassation (Cass.) [supreme court for judicial matters] Ie civ., Apr. 2, 2008, Bull.
civ. I, No. 04-17726 (Fr.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080402fl.html.
68. See, e.g. COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS 42 (Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009) (elaborating on the difference
between "rule" and "law" or "law of a state" when discussing the applicability of the UNIDROIT
Principles by the arbitrators).
69. See Fan Yang, The Application of the CISG in the Current PRC Law & CIETAC Arbitration
Practice, 2 NORDIC J. COMMERCIAL L. 2, 2-28 (2006).
70. CIETAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 43.
71. GPCL, supra note 53, art. 142.
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pursuant to the "closest connection formula." 73 To explain its rejection, the tribu-
nal held that, although UNIDROIT Principles did qualify as "international prac-
tices," they could only be applied "in the absence of relevant rules of the applica-
ble domestic law." 74 As Chinese contract law contains rules to settle the dispute,
there is no justification to resort to "international practices."
4. The Chinese Four-Step Process in the Applicable Law Identification
Process
As summarized above, in a typical case, the applicable law identification
process under the "Chinese pattern" has four steps, meaning that arbitrators must
in turn identify (1) the type of the contract, (2) the applicable conflict of laws
rule(s), (3) the applicable substantive law and (4) the exact rule(s) of the applica-
ble substantive law. These four steps are not always clear-cut, but can often be
fulfilled in an integral manner in practice. As indicated above, with such a process
in place, the space for arbitrators to exercise their choice-of-law power is rather
limited; rather, arbitrators' choice-of-law power can only be exercised in a few
exceptional situations.
Although the "four-step process" can enhance the predictability of arbitration,
the process has several defects. First, it complicates the applicable law identifica-
tion process, which puts the efficiency and flexibility of arbitration in danger.
Second, it actually confines arbitrators' choice-of-law power to a few exceptional
situations, which puts arbitrators under Chinese law in an inferior position com-
pared with their international counterparts. Third, as this process is established by
CCL, GPCL, LAL and the SPC judicial interpretations, it is not tailored for arbi-
tration but applies to both arbitrators and the judges. By bluffing the difference
between arbitration and litigation, the private nature of arbitration is not suffi-
ciently respected.76 For these reasons, Chinese law's restrictions amount to a de
facto prohibition although Chinese law does not impose a de jure ban on arbitra-
tors' choice-of-law power. Thus one may have reason to say that the "Chinese
pattern" actually represents the lowest level of the arbitrators' choice-of-law
power in modem international arbitration.
V. POWER OF ISSUING INTERIM MEASURES
An interim measure generally refers to a temporary measure issued by either
the courts or the arbitral tribunals at any time prior to the issuance of the final
award, whether in the form of an award or in another form. 77 In international arbi-
tration, interim measures may have substantial impacts on the final result because




76. Chi Manjiao, Application of the UNIDROIT Principles in China: Successes, Shortcomings and
Implications, 15 UNIF. L. REV. 5, 33 (2010).
77. See 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 18, art.17(2).
No. 2] 275
17
Manjiao: Manjiao: Are We Paper Tigers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the course of the proceedings. 8 But due to the silence of international treaties and
diversified and insufficient domestic laws in this respect, the issue of interim
measures has been one of the hurdles for the development of international com-
mercial arbitration in the past decade.79 It is thus necessary to explore and com-
pare whether and to what extent arbitrators can issue interim measures in China
and elsewhere.
A. The International Practice
In international arbitration, there are two major approaches for granting in-
terim measures, which can be roughly referred to as the "judicial approach" and
the "concurrent approach." The judicial approach is quite traditional, meaning that
courts retain exclusive power of issuing interim measures while those ordered by
arbitrators are proclaimed as inadmissible. This approach is adopted by some
domestic laws. More recently, however, interim measures are increasingly relied
upon in the practice of international commercial arbitration.82 To meet the in-
creased practical needs, many states began to recognize the need to allow arbitra-
tors to order interim measures either by explicit provisions of law or agreement of
parties. Consequently, the "concurrent approach" has been gradually established
and widely accepted, meaning that both courts and arbitrators have the power of
issuing interim measures at their own discretion.
A typical manifestation of the "concurrent approach" can be found in the
1985 Model Law. The 1985 Model Law states, "Unless the parties have otherwise
agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any party to take
such interim measures of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider neces-
sary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. . . ." The 1985 Model Law
approach is revised by the 2006 Model Law. The 2006 Model Law not only con-
firms the "concurrent approach" but also broadens arbitrators' freedom by remov-
ing the restrictive wording "in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute." The
provision now reads that, "[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral
78. See Raymond J. Werbicki, Arbitral Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 62,
63 (2002); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 753-754 (Deventer/Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1994).
79. See generally Jean-Paul Beraudo, Recognition and Enforcement of Interim Measures of Protec-
tion Ordered by Arbitral Tribunals: A Comparison of the Congo Pre-Arbitral Referee Case, 22 J.
INT'L ARB. 245, 245-250 (2005).
80. See Zhivko Stalev, Interim Measures of Protection in the Context of Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 105-108 (Albert J. Van Den Berg ed., Kluwer
Law and Taxation 1994).
81. See, e.g., CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [BRAZILIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] arts. 1086-
1087; KODIKAs POLITIKlS DIKONOMIAS [GREEK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 685;
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] (ceasing to be effective after The Arbi-
tration Act of Germany came into force in 1998); CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [ITALIAN CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE], art. 818.
82. See U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Report of the Working Group on Arbitration
on the work of its thirty-second session, 13-16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (Apr. 10, 2000).
83. See, e.g., WETBOEK VAN BURGERLUKE RECHTSVORDERING [CODE OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE NETHERLANDS], art. 1022; SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [Swiss CIVIL PROCEDURE
CODE], art. 183; BURGERLIIK WETBOEK [BELGIUM CIVIL CODE], art. 1696(1).
84. 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 17, art. 17.
276 [Vol. 2011
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss2/2
tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures."85 Similar provi-
sions may be found in many leading arbitration rules. 86 In addition to express
recognition of the "concurrent approach," many arbitration rules also authorize
arbitrators to "conduct the arbitration in the manner they deem appropriate" sub-
ject to the applicable arbitration rules and laws.87 This provision may also be
deemed to impliedly authorize the arbitrators to grant interim measures as they see
appropriate.
B. The Chinese Practice
Chinese law recognizes two types of interim measures: measures for evidence
preservation in foreign-related arbitration and measures for property preservation.
Interestingly, these measures are provided by different laws: CAL deals with
measures for evidence preservation while CPL deals with measures for property
preservation. The CAL provision states that, "[i]f a party applies for evidence
preservation in a foreign-related arbitration, the arbitration institution shall submit
such application to the intermediate courts of the place where the respondent has
its domicile or where such evidence is located."8 The CPL provision though,
states that, "[i]f a party applies for property preservation, the arbitration institution
shall submit such application to the intermediate courts of the place where the
respondent has its domicile or where such property is located."89 Indeed, there
seems to be little reason why CAL does not deal with both types of interim meas-
ures in a more integral way.
CAL's inability to deal with both interim measures in an integral way is
"cured" by Chinese arbitration rules. For instance, the CIETAC Rules contain two
provisions dealing with these two types of interim measures respectively. The
provision in Article 17 regarding measures for the preservation of property states
that:
When any party applies for the preservation of property, the CIETAC
shall forward the party's application for a ruling to the competent court at
the place where the domicile of the party against whom the preservation
of property is sought is located or where the property of the said party is
located.
However, the provision in Article 18 regarding measures for preservation of evi-
dence states that, "When a party applies for the protection of evidence, the
CIETAC shall forward the party's application for a ruling to the competent court
at the place where the evidence is located."
85. 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 18, art. 17(1).
86. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 3, art. 26(1); ICC Rules, supra note 3, art. 23(1); LCIA
Rules, supra note 3, art. 25; WIPO Rules, supra note 3, art. 46(a); AAA Rules, supra note 3, art. 21(1);
HKIAC Rules, supra note 3, art. 24; SCC Rules, supra note 3, art. 32(1); 2010 UNCIRAL Rules,
supra note 3, art. 26(1); SIAC Rules, supra notes 3, art. 26(1).
87. See, e.g., SCC Rules, supra note 3, art. 19(1); 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 3, art.17(l);
SIAC Rules, supra note 3, art.16(1).
88. CAL, supra note 11, art. 68.
89. CPL, supra note 10, art. 25.
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Similar provisions may also be found in the BAC Rules,90 and the SHAC
Rules.9i Interestingly, the SZAC Rules not only contain two similar provisions,92
but also put forward an extra provision dealing with interim measures exclusively
in "foreign-related arbitration proceedings." 93 This extra provision is redundant
since it is essentially the same as the other two.
Two basic observations can be drawn from a close reading of the above pro-
visions. First, different from the international practices, arbitrators under Chinese
law have no power to grant interim measures; rather, such power goes to courts.
Particularly, as a typical result of the "dual-track system" in Chinese arbitration
law, only intermediate courts are allowed to grant interim measures in foreign-
related arbitration, while basic-level courts are allowed to grant interim measures
in domestic arbitration. 94 Second, Chinese law is silent on the situation where
parties submit their application directly to courts although Chinese law expressly
requires parties to apply interim measures through arbitration institutions. On this
issue, judicial practices present a negative answer. For example, the High Court of
Shanghai clearly held that if parties directly apply for the issuance or termination
95of interim measures to the court, such application should be rejected. Third, a
practical defect lies in that, given the rampant local protectionism of courts in
many parts of China, the denial of arbitrators' power of issuing interim measures
could reduce the chances for parties to obtain interim measures. Local protection-
ism is a typical consequence of the "central-local tension" incurred by the struc-
ture of the courts and the economic reform in China.96 On one side, local govern-
ments are required to provide financial and personnel support to local courts;9 on
the other, local governments are deprived of certain revenue by the reform, which
necessitates protection of the local enterprises as contributors of their revenues.98
It is for this reason that local courts are sometimes reluctant to grant interim
measures against local enterprises, particularly the measures to freeze their prop-
erties, since in reality "protecting" local enterprises is to protect the courts them-
selves.
90. BAC Rules, supra note 26, art.14 (Preservation of Property), & art. 15 (Preservation of Evi-
dence).
91. SHAC Rules, supra note 26, art.19 (Preservation of Property), & art. 38 (Preservation of Evi-
dence).
92. SZAC Rules, supra note 26, ch. III, r. 23 (Preservation of Property), ch. V, r. 46 (Preservation of
Evidence).
93. Id. at ch. X1II, r. 99.
94. CAL, supra note I1, arts. 28 & 46.
95. This Shanghai High Court decision was adopted on January 3, 2001 and came into force on
Februrary 1, 2001. See art. 7, available at http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/p_2/136440.html (last visited
16 Oct. 2011).
96. See David T. Wang, Judicial Reform in China: Improving Arbitration Award Enforcement by
Establishing a Federal Court System, 48 SANTA CLARA L. R. 649, 659 (2008); Randall Peerenboom,
The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in People's Republic of
China, I ASIAN-PAC. L & POL'Y J. 1, 63 (2000).
97. Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
97, 120 (2005).
98. David T. Wang, supra note 96, at 658-60.
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C. Comparing Interim Measures in International Arbitration and
Arbitration in China
Interim measures are an important aspect of arbitration in both procedural and
substantive senses. While it is widely recognized that international arbitrators are
entitled to grant interim measures upon the request of parties without necessarily
resorting to the courts, arbitrators under Chinese law are grossly deprived of such
power. Rather, such power is monopolized by intermediate courts and parties
must submit their applications through arbitration institutions. Given the increas-
ing importance of interim measures in modem international arbitration, China's
denial of arbitrators' power in issuing interim measures is fundamentally defec-
tive. It incurs intervention from both arbitration institutions and courts, which
would inevitably hurt the efficiency and autonomy of arbitration. In essence, de-
nial of arbitrators' power of issuing interim measures is simply a reflection of
China's long-rooted distrust in arbitration. Nonetheless, even if the courts' mo-
nopolization were to be maintained given the current sociopolitical situation in
China, it is still suggested that parties be allowed to directly apply for interim
measures to the courts in order to remove unnecessary involvement of arbitration
institutions for the sake of efficiency. 99 It is suggested that more types of interim
measures be allowed as well. 1m
VI. CONCLUSION
When arbitrators have procedural power in conducting arbitration, it is an im-
plied reflection of the private and autonomous nature of arbitration-which has
both procedural and substantive significance in practice. After comparing the
practice of the three major aspects of arbitrator's power in international arbitration
to arbitration in China, it is evident that arbitrators under Chinese law enjoy a
much lower level of such power compared to their international counterparts.
International arbitrators, on the other hand, are generally allowed to make jurisdic-
tional decisions at their discretion pursuant to the competence-competence doc-
trine when exercising their procedural power. Chinese law, however, does not
truly and fully adopt the competence-competence doctrine but instead allocates
such power to the arbitration institutions and the courts.
Concerning the choice-of-law power, international arbitrators are generally
granted "unlimited choice-of-law power," "substantive choice-of-law power," or
at least "procedural choice-of-law power" and enjoy a higher degree of power.
Chinese law, however, imposes heavy restrictions on arbitrators so that they can
only exercise such power in exceptional situations. Regarding the power of issu-
ing interim measures, international arbitrators are generally authorized to grant
interim measures at their own discretion upon the request of parties. Chinese law,
on the other hand, grants such power exclusively to courts.
99. Peter Thorp, The PRC Arbitration Law: Problems and Prospects for Amendment, 24 J. INT'L
ARB. 607, 611 (2007).
100. Chi Manjiao, Is It Time for Chance? - A Comparative Study of Chinese Arbitration Law and
the 2006 Revision UNICTRAL Model Law, 5 ASIAN J. INT'L ARB.142, 156 (2009).
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Admittedly, these three aspects are different, but the common line running
through them remains the same: they all demonstrate from different perspectives
that arbitrators' procedural power is heavily restricted or denied under Chinese
law. These restrictions have many defects: they complicate the arbitral proceed-
ings, paralyze arbitrators in conducting arbitration, invite premature court inter-
vention at various stages of arbitration, and ultimately hurt the flexibility, effi-
ciency, and autonomy of arbitration. These defects are so harmful that they have
the potential to make arbitration an "alter ego" of litigation in China. In this sense,
it is not an exaggeration to state that arbitrators under Chinese law are "paper
tigers" because their procedural power largely remains nominal which can hardly
be realized to make them "genuine arbitrators." Further, these defects also show
that China lacks a true autonomous arbitration regime. If China does not maintain
a true autonomous arbitration regime, Chinese arbitration will lose its competi-
tiveness at the international level in the long run.
More fundamentally, China's restriction on arbitrators' procedural power re-
flects the intense "struggle" between state (judicial) power and private (arbitral)
power in the context of arbitration. Due to the private and autonomous nature of
arbitration, arbitrators derive their power from parties' agreement and exercise
such power at their own discretion. In some sense, vesting power into arbitrators
would inevitably "result in" arbitrators encroaching on courts' judicial power.
While it is true that a sound balance between judicial power and arbitral power is
hard to achieve,10 there does exist a global consensus that states are accommodat-
ing arbitration to further promote and liberalize international trade and investment.
For instance, many states are gradually lifting their requirements on the issue of
arbitrability to allow more types of disputes to be arbitrated, and that state them-
selves are getting more comfortable to resort to arbitration to settle their disputes
with private parties.' 02
Though China is trying to build itself into an "arbitration-friendly country,"
the reality provides little reason for optimism. Although Chinese law and leading
Chinese institutional arbitration rules appear quite similar to their international
counterparts at first glimpse, they are essentially different. The difference lies in
their respective strategies in balancing arbitral power vis-a-vis judicial power.
Chinese law overstresses the latter by sacrificing the former. The restriction or
denial of arbitrators' power under Chinese law goes hand in hand with the
strengthening of state power. This development is a result of China's long-rooted
and highly centralized economic and political system. As long as the Chinese
101. See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence and Fairness: A Case Study of the
Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 313 (2007). This paper discusses the doubts
of independence of Chinese arbitration institutions, which is a typical and most vivid explanation of
the conflict between judicial/state control and arbitral power/party control in the Chinese contexts.
102. For instance, the ICSID is the most prominent forum for settling state-investor disputes, and 146
states have ratified or accepted the ICSID Convention up to now. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2011). China ratified the ICSID Convention in 1993, but according its reservation under art.
25(4) of the Convention, the jurisdiction of ICSID is limited to "disputes over compensation resulting
from expropriation and nationalization." As a matter of fact, up to now, the only ICSID case that
directly involved China is the recent case of Ekran Berhad v. P.R.C. (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15
(May 24, 2011)). Besides, many state-investor disputes are also settled under Chapter II of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See NAFTA CLAIMS, available at
http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
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government remains reluctant to carry out a full-range judicial reform in support
of a truly autonomous arbitration regime, it would be hard to predict when and at
what pace such a situation could be fundamentally changed. Until then, arbitrators
in China are merely "paper tigers."
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